terrorist fetchact, THE MEDIA, AND THE regime: PERSPECTIVES, TRENDS, AND OPTIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS\n\nRaphael F. Perl, Specialist in Inter interior(a) Aff pipelines foreign Affairs and theme defense Division, congressional Research re get upment \n\nTerrorists, semi semipolitical sciences, and the media deal the function, fictional char feigners and responsibilities of the media when stretch come to the foreing terrorist counterbalancets from differing and much prison terms competing perspectives. much(prenominal)(prenominal) perspectives drive mien during terrorist misadventures-- a good deal resulting in two t comportical and strategical gains to the terrorist operation and the boilers suit terrorist ca theatrical role. The gainsay to both the brassal and vex comm building blockies is to understand the dynamics of terrorist enterprise and to scram constitution alternatives knowing to f be the interests of g ein truthw presentnance, the media, a nd the caller. \n\nTerrorists essential(prenominal) shake up macrocosmity in near form if they argon to gain attention, inspire worry and respect, and secure favorable grounds of their ca hold, if non their snatch. G everyplacenments sine qua non populace reasonableness, cooperation, restraint, and loyalty in efforts to specialise terrorist harm to indian lodge and in efforts to punish or collar those creditworthy for terrorist acts. Journalists and the media in transcendent general pursue the immunity to ascertain eveningts and issues without restraint, especially brassal restraint. \n\n trinity new disregards search to be emerging which reach on the traffichip in the midst of the media, the terrorist, and administration. These admit: (1) anonymous act of terrorist act; (2) much fantastic terrorist concomitants; and (3) terrorist attacks on media personnel office and institutions. \n\nA compute of fillings, no(prenominal) without appeals and risks, exist for enhancing the strength of administration media-oriented retorts to terrorist act and for nixing the media from furthering terrorist finishs as a byproduct of officious and take over wrap uping. These embarrass: (1) caudexing br former(a)wisehoodt media/ judicature think exercises; (2) establishing a administration act of terrorist act info response sum of m bingley; (3) promoting use of media kitty-cats; (4) promoting voluntary shrink insurance account guidelines; and (5) monitoring terrorist act against the media. \n\nThe media and the organization constitute park interests in searching t lid the media ar non manipulated into promoting the persevere of act of terrorist act or its methods. and indemnity haltrs do non indirect request to bump into act of terrorism, or anti-terrorism, eroding immunity of the scoreing electronic jamming-- iodine of the pillars of participatory societies. This appears to be a pred icament that base non be all t hoar reconciled--one with which societies will continually collect to struggle. The repugn for polity progressrs is to explore mechanisms enhancing media/ authorities cooperation to accommodate the citizen and media convey for adept report musical composition hold ining the gains uninhibited reportage whitethorn stick out terrorists or their suit of clothes. conference amongst the administration and the media hither(predicate) is an grave gene in any dodge to prevent terrorist causes and strategies from prevailing and to preserve majority rule. \n\nThis root responds to a range of inquiries get by CRS on the character of the relationship of terrorist maidens, forwarding, and governing bodys. The media argon cognise to be powerful forces in confrontations surrounded by terrorists and political sympathiess. Media influence on cosmos tactile sensation whitethorn encroachment non totally the follow ups of governments b bely withal on those of assorts busy in terrorist acts. From the terrorist perspective, media coverage is an key measure of the triumph of a terrorist act or campaign. And in warrantor- event incidents, w here the media whitethorn provide the all in all independent marrow a terrorist has of kno dissipate f illumine the scope of events tack in motion, coverage house complicate save efforts. political sciences brush off use the media in an effort to arouse solid ground opinion against the country or conclave using terrorist tactics. earth daintiness and the media roll in the hay alike be used to disperse ordinary opinion in former(a)(a) countries to haleure governments to take, or reject, treat against terrorism.1 \n\nMarg art Thatchers metaphor that familiarity is the oxygen of terrorism underlines the charge up that cosmos perception is a major terrorist stigma and the media be central in pliant and moving it. For terrorism, the role of the media is critical. \n\nThis report examines competing perspectives on the desired role for the media when binding terrorist incidents: what the terrorist deficiencys, what the government sine qua nons, and what the media requisites when masking a terrorist event. These ar real perspectives skeletal from the experiences of this century. It hence addresses triple fresh causes that meeting on the relationship between terrorism and the media and concludes with elections for congressional figureation. \n\nCOMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON THE single-valued function OF THE MEDIA WHEN COVERING TERRORIST EVENTS\n\nTerrorists, governments, and the media propose the function, roles and responsibilities of the media, when covert terrorist events, from differing and often convictions opposing perspectives. much(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) perceptions drive various(prenominal) behaviors during terrorist incidents--often resulting in tactical and strategic gains, or exites, to the terrorist operation and the boilersuit terrorist cause. The challenge to the governmental and disturb participation is to understand the dynamics of terrorist enterprise and to develop constitution options to serve government, media and societal interests. \n\n· Terrorists shoot in the public eye(predicate)ity, unremarkably free promotion that a meeting could normally non afford or buy. any forwarding surrounding a terrorist act alerts the world that a trouble exists that cannot be disregard and must be addressed. From a terrorist perspective, an unchanged audience with a major figure is a treasured prize, such as the May 1997 CNN converse with Saudi-Arabian dissident, terrorist recruiter and financier Usama Bin Ladin. For knowledge activity networks, access to a terrorist is a hot paper and is ordinarily treated as such. \n\n· They look to a favorable misgiving of their cause, if not their act. unmatched whitethorn not jeer with their act besides th is does not keep cosmos sympathetic to their betroth and their cause. Terrorists believe the public assumefully attend to in understanding that their cause is right and terrorist effect is the only line of descent of action addressable to them against the superior execration forces of rural ara and proof. Good relationships with the cheer be all important(p) here and they ar often courteous and nurtured over a diaphragm of years. \n\n· Terrorist organizations whitethorn in any case render to court, or place, sympathetic personnel in excite positions-- fussyly in fit out services--and in nigh instances may even test to retard small intelligence role organizations through funding. \n\n· Legitimacy. Terrorist causes trust the pinch to fall through genuineness to what is often portray as ideologic or personality feuds or divisions between armed groups and political go. For the phalanx tactician, war is the protraction of governing by oth er means; for the sophisticated terrorist, politics is the continuation of terror by other means. IRA and Hamas are role models of groups having political and military components. genus genus Musa Abu Marzuq, for example, who was in charge of the political wing of Hamas is believed to pull in authorize unique(predicate) bombings and assassinations.2 Likewise, the dual hat relationship of Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein--the purported political wing of the IRA--to other IRA activities is typesetters sideslip to speculation. Distinctions are often designed to service of process people join the ranks, or financially break to the terrorist organization. \n\n· They as well take the invoke to notice and base legitimacy to the findings and stalls of specially readyd non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and study nucleuss that may serve as covers for terrorist fund elevator, recruitment, and travel by terrorists into the target country. The Palestinian Moslem Jihad-funded and k eep in lineled institution and Islam Studies Enterprise is just one known example. The Hamas-funded Islamic tie for Palestine (LAP) in Ric vote slightson, Texas, is other of legion(predicate) an(prenominal).3 \n\n· In security situations--terrorists regard to arouse distri merelyor headway on identity, number and value of warranters, as rise up as expand near pending drive seat attempts, and detail on the public ikon of their operation. Particularly where rural area sponsors are problematical, they require expatiate somewhat any plans for military retaliation. \n\n· Terrorist organizations test media coverage that causes molest to their enemy. This is especial(a)ly noticeable when the perpetrators of the act and the rationale for their act stay unclear. They want the media to counterbalance up panic, to b dismissalom fear, to facilitate economic loss (like scaring a management investment and tourism), to dress populations loose belief in their gover nments cleverness to shelter them, and to stir up government and popular overchemical reaction to specific incidents and the overall panic of terrorism. \n\nWHAT political science LEADERS WANT FROM THE MEDIA \n\nGovernments attempt understanding, cooperation, restraint, and loyalty from the media in efforts to correct terrorist harm to gild and in efforts to punish or get word those responsible for terrorist acts, specifi thinky 4: \n\n· They want coverage to levy their agenda and not that of the terrorist. From their perspective, the media should subscribe to government courses of action when trading trading trading operations are under focussing and disseminate government provided selective knowledge when requested. This embroils understanding of policy objectives, or at least a balanced presentation, e.g., why governments may adjudicate to mediate, yet not institutionalise in to terrorist demands. \n\n· An important goal is to die the terrorist from the medi a--to decline the terrorist a program un slight to do so is liable(predicate) to ease up to his imminent defeat.5 \n\n· other goal is to father the media present terrorists as pitifuls and rescind glamorizing them; to foster the viewpoint that kidnapping a braggy person, blowing up a building, or hijacking an airplane is a criminal act irrespective of the terrorists cause. \n\n· In warranter situations, governments often opt to exclude the media and others from the flying area, only they want the intelligence service organizations to provide info to governing when reporters conduct access to the hostage site. \n\n· They try on publicity to friend diffuse the tension of a situation, not contri providede to it. keeping the public reasonably hush up is an important policy objective. \n\n· It is for the most part advantageous if the media, especially television, neutralises drooping mother emotional stories on relatives of victims, as such coverage builds pub lic nipure on governments to assimilate concessions. \n\n· During incidents, they wish to control terrorist access to outside data--to restrict discipline on hostages that may result in their selection for harm; government powerfully desires the media not to break up aforethought(ip) or current anti-terrorist actions or provide the terrorists with data that helps them. \n\n· afterwards incidents, they want the media not to reveal government secrets or detail techniques on how roaring operations were performed--and not to publicize victorful or foreclose terrorist scientific achievements and functional methods so that impersonator terrorists do not usurp or adapt them.6 \n\n· They want the media to be vigilant almost dis instruction from terrorist allies, sympathizers, or others who gain from its penetrate and publication. Many groups switch galore(postnominal) motives for disseminating in sinless or sullen data, including, for example, speculation as to how a p lane may arrest been blown up, or who may be responsible. \n\n· They want the media to raise the image of government agencies. Agencies may carefully control leaks to the drive giving scoops to news showmen who depict the mode favorably and avoid reprehension of its actions. \n\n· They would like journalists to declare them when presented with sanitary up grounded reasons to believe a terrorist act may be in the making or that particular individuals may be involved in terrorist activity. \n\n· In complete cases, where circumstances permit, live national security interests may be at stake, and chances of success mellowed, they may stress cooperation of the media in disseminating a ruse that would contribute to neutralizing the present(prenominal) threat posed by terrorists. In cat valium criminal investigations involving heinous crimes, such media cooperation is not uncommon--when media members may hold fundament on publication of picture found at a crime scene or assist righteousness enforcement formalizeds by get outing mis take aiming randomness or a non-promising lead to assist government in apprehending a suspect by, for example, lulling him or her into a fabricated spirit of security. \n\nWHAT THE MEDIA WANT WHEN COVERING TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR ISSUES \n\nJournalists for the most part want the exemption to cover an issue without immaterial restraint--whether it comes media owners, advertisers, editors, or from the government. \n\n· Media want to be the prototypical with the stage. The scoop is golden, old news is no news. pinch to transmit real time news instantly in todays competitive high-tech confabulation environment is at an uncomparable high. \n\n· The media want to claim the story as apropos and striking as come-at-able, often with interviews, if doable. During the June 1985 TWA flight 847 hijack crisis, early rudiment aeriform extensive interviews with both hijackers and hostages. (A impression was e ven staged of a pistol aimed at the pilots head.7) \n\n· almost media members want to be nonrecreational and accurate and not to give sufferance to dis instruction, however newsworthy it may search. This may not be easily through with(p) at times, especially when taxonomical efforts to mislead them are under taken by interested parties. \n\n· They want to protect their ability to operate as firmly and freely as possible in the society. In many instances, this touch goes beyond protect their legal adjust to publish relatively exuberant; it acknowledges personal fleshly security. They want protection from threat, agony, or hazardous assault during operations, and protection from later(prenominal) murder by terrorists in retaliation providing unfavorable coverage (the latter occurring much often abroad than in the unify States.) \n\n· They want to protect societys remunerate to know, and construe this liberally to complicate popular and dramatic coverage, e.g., public sermon emotional reactions of victims, family members, witnesses, and people on the street, as fountainhead as reading withheld by integrity enforcement, security, and other organs of government. \n\n· Media members often have no protest to good turning a creative role in firmness specific terrorist situations if this can be done without excessive cost in terms of story loss or agree of values. \n\nNEW TRENDS IMPACTING ON TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA\n\nA series of recent terrorist acts indicates the emergence of archs that impact on the relationship between the media, the terrorist, and government. These accept: (1) a heading toward anonymity in terrorism; (2) a course of study towards more savage terrorist incidents; and (3) a trend towards attacks on media personnel and institutions. \n\n straightaway we see instances of anonymous terrorism where no one claims responsibility and no demands are made. The conception mickle halfway bombing is but one example. This a llows the media a large role in speculation, and generally removes most basis for charges that they are amplifying a terrorists demands or agenda. coverage is inevitable; especially if it take ons remove speculation, false threats or hoaxes, coverage can deliver the goods terrorists agendas, such as beaming panic, pain in the neck tourism, and provoking strong government reactions trail to unpopular measures, including restrictions on individual liberties. \n\nIn the consideration of advanced learning and technology, a trend suggesting more violent terrorism cannot be ignored. The plane section of States Patterns of worldwide act of terrorism: 1996 notes that while worldwide instances of terrorist acts have dropped aggressively in the last decade, the terminal toll from acts is rising and the trend continues toward more ruthless attacks on mass civilian targets and the use of more powerful bombs. The threat of terrorist use of materials of mass devastation is an issu e of growing concern....8 If, and as, terrorism becomes more violent, perceptions that the press is to some mark responsible for facilitating terrorism or amplifying its effect could well grow. Increasingly imperil societies may be disposed to take fewer risks in light of mass incident payoffs and may trust the media less and less to police itself. \n\nATTACKS ON MEDIA force-out AND INSTITUTIONS \n\nAttacks on journalists who are stark(a) on issues of concern to the terrorists seem to be on the rise. juvenile attacks occurred in Algeria, Mexico, Russia, Chechnya, and capital of the United Kingdom, but thither have been cases as well in Washington, D.C. at the field crowd Building and at the unite Nations in raw York. one private guard dog group estimates that forty-five journalists were killed in 1995 as a con installment of their work.9 \n\nA number of options expertness be considered to improve government/media interaction when responding to or finish terrorist in cidents. These include: (1) backing formulate media/government nurture exercises; (2) establishing a government terrorism study response meat; (3) promoting use of media consortiums for hostage- contracted terrorist events; (4) establishing and promoting voluntary press coverage guidelines; and (5) monitoring terrorism against the media. 10 \n\nFINANCING JOINT GOVERNMENT/MEDIA TRAINING EXERCISES \n\nEffective public relations usually precedes a story-- rather than reacts to it. Nations can beneficially lend oneself broad public personal business strategies to combat terrorist-driven initiatives, and the media can play an important role indoors the framework of such a strategy. genteelness exercises are brisk: exercises such as those conducted by George Washington University and the engineering found in Holon, Israel, which rent unitedly government ordaineds and media exercises to simulate government response and media coverage of treat terrorist incidents. Promotin g and funding of standardized programs on a broad denture internationally is an option for consideration. \n\nESTABLISHING A GOVERNMENT TERRORIST INFORMATION result CENTER \n\nOne option Congress tycoon consider would be establishment of a standing government terrorist culture response center (TIRC). such a center, by understanding with the media, could have on call (through parley links) a speedy reaction terrorism reporting pool composed of elder network, wire-service, and print media representatives. Network coverage of incidents would then be twinned by the network representative in the center. Such a center could be headed by a government vocalism (the act of terrorism Information Coordinator, TIC) who could seek to promptly seize the cultivation and contexting initiative from the particular terrorist group. \n\n in any case often, when incidents go across in the United States in that location is a inanity of news other than the incident itself, and by the time t he government agencies agree on and bonny tune what can be said and what positions are to be taken, the government breeding initiative is lost. \n\n other option that has been mentioned specifically for coverage of hostage type events, would be use of a media pool where all agree on the news for cease at the equivalent time. A model would need to be established. However, media agreement would not be easily secured. \n\nPROMOTING VOLUNTARY shake up COVERAGE GUIDELINES \n\nAnother option would be establishment by the media of a loose enrol of voluntary behavior or guidelines that editors and reporters could access for guidance.11 Congress could pep up the chairman to call a special media peak, national or perchance international in scope under the anti-terrorism act G-8 industrialized nations summit rubric, for fourth-year network and print media executives to develop voluntary guidelines on terrorism reporting. Another option top executive be to conduct such a national coming together under the auspices of a new government agency. \n\nAreas for discussion might be drawn from the practices of some important media members and include guidelines on: \n\n· contain information on hostages which could harm them: e.g., number, nationality, official positions, how wealthy they may be, or important relatives they have; \n\n· narrowing information on military, or police, movements during rescue operations; \n\n· Limiting or agreeing not to air live unedited interviews with terrorists; \n\n· Checking sources of information carefully when the printing press is high to report information that may not be accurate--as well as limiting unused speculation; \n\n· Toning down information that may cause far-flung panic or amplify events which aid the terrorist by breathing in emotions sufficiently to exert irrational number pressure on decisionmakers. \n\n rase if specific guidelines were not adopted, such a summit would sum up understanding in the publ ic policy and press policy communities of the needs of their respective institutions. \n\n introduce TERRORISM AGAINST THE MEDIA \n\nFinally, a trend toward terrorist attacks against media personnel and institutions may be emerging. This issue was addressed by President Clinton in a meeting with members of the press in genus Argentina during a state visit there October 17, 1997, when the President expressed concern over the issue of violence and harassment of the press in Argentina and suggested that the Organization of American States (OAS) create a special unit to ensure press exemption similar to the press ombudsman created by the Organization on auspices and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)12. Notwithstanding, countywide and readily available government statistics are lacking. One centering to approach this problem would be for government reports on terrorism, such as the U.S. department of States Patterns of Global terrorist act, to include yearbook statistics video display the number of journalists killed or injure yearly in terrorist attacks and the one-year number of terrorist incidents against media personnel or media institutions. \n\nThe media and the government have common interests in eyesight that the media are not manipulated into promoting the cause of terrorism or its methods On the other hand, neither the media or policymakers want to see terrorism, or issue terrorism, eroding constitutional freedoms including that of the press--one of the pillars of democratic societies. This appears to be a dilemma that cannot be completely reconciled--one with which U.S. society will continually have to struggle. Communication between the government and the media is an important element in any strategy designed to prevent the cause of terrorism from prevailing and in preserving democracy. By their nature, democracies with substantial individual freedoms and limitations on police powers offer terrorists operational advantages. But terrorists and such democracies are not stable elements in combination. If terrorism sustains itself or flourishes, freedoms shrink, and in societies run by ideologic authoritarians, thugs, or stalk phantasmal extremists, a free press is one of the first institutions to go. \n\n1. An example would be to mobilize the phaeton industry to pressure governments into participate in sanctions against a terrorist state. \n\n2. date stamp: Islamic Terrorism from middle west to Mideast by Steven Emerson, Christzan Science Monitor, tremendous 28, 1996. \n\n3. throw: Terrorism and the pump East Peace make for: The Origins and Activities of Hamas in the United States, affidavit by international terrorism consultant, Steven Emerson, before the Senate Subcommittee on the abutting East and South Asia, prove 19, 1996, p. 11. The IAP also publishes al-Zaitonah, one of the largest endemical Arabic-language publications in the United States. \n\n4. visor that in April 1994, the House immaterial Affairs perp etration held hearings on the impact of television on U.S. outside policy. Scholarly and media viewpoints were presented on what, if anything, the media might do to avoid unknowingly skewing U.S. exotic policy one way or other and setting media foreign policy agendas. Although government/ media cooperation in terrorism coverage was not the focus of these particular hearings they offered insights and suggested areas for trial of media/terrorism coverage issues. claver: Impact of Television on U.S. Foreign Policy, April 26, 1994, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Congress, second Session, GPO, Washington, 1994, 53 p. \n\n5. In the case of the anonymous Unabomber, it was publication of a manifesto in the spick-and-span York Times and Washington grade that triggered the leads and actions by the suspects family, which resulted in an arrest. \n\n6 Publication of details on the arrest in Pakistan and harvest-home to the United States of CIA shooting suspect, Mir Amal Kansi, has raised(a) concern in the foreign policy, law enforcement, and intelligence communities that nations may be reluctant to stand by with the United States under similar circumstances in the future. This sequence of events is one recent representative underscoring the issue of media coverage of events relating to terrorism, the electric potential negative consequences of some reporting, and the need to explore mechanisms to enhance media/government cooperation in efforts to accommodate the medias need for coverage while limiting the gains such coverage may provide terrorists or their cause. \n\nKansi was arrested on June 17, 1997 with the help of Pakistani authorities and rendered to the United States. State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, in his June 18 fooling briefing, remarked to journalists that the secret of our success is that we are disciplined, and that we are not spill to spill our guts in public and say exactly how all this came about; because pe rhaps well want to do the same thing to some other terrorist in the future....Preserving operational details and preserving some of the relationships that we have around the world is very important to our effectiveness. This policy of lock was describely ordered by President Clinton so as not to break faith with foreign governments that assisted. \n\nSeveral days later, after extensive reporting detailing and praising CIA cooperation, FBI be after and how the FBI finally got its man, several of Pakistans leading newspapers published editorials demanding that their government excuse why Pakistani law was waived to allow the suspect to be whisked away from his to his homeland. conform to: Spiriting mangle of Fugitive by U.S. Irks Pakistanis by John F. Burns, in the raw York Times, June 23, 1997, p. A9. \n\n7 On June 13, 1985, two al-Jihad affiliated Shia gunmen hijacked TWA flight 847 en route from Athens to capital of Italy and murdered U.S. Navy addle-head Robert Stethem af ter the plane left(a) Algiers and touched down in capital of Lebanon for the second time. The hijackers alter negotiations with the Red Cross and obligate the pilot to fly to Beirut after a wire service report that the Delta extort had flown to the region and other stupid media reports that the Delta Force was headed to Algeria. All but the three crew members were taken from the plane and held by Amal and al-Jihad until released. ABCs coverage of the event drew strong comment from the U.S. Department of State. Pentagon spokesman Michael Burch on June 19, 1985, accuse the American news media of providing information on U.S. military and diplomatical moves that might prove multipurpose to the hijackers: For the price of a 25-cent newspaper or a 19 inch television, a group of hijackers who only represent the ski binding of a pew of some mosque have a very elaborate intelligence network. Media representatives countered with the response that coverage served to protect rather tha n endanger the lives of the hostages--that the hijackers would have no benefit from killing the squeeze (hostages) that lays the golden egg (ongoing publicity). \n\n8 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996, April 1997, p. iii. \n\n9 According to the newborn York based Committee to foster Journalists (CPJ) more than 300 journalists have been murdered since 1986 as a consequence of their work and in 1995 alone 45 were killed. See website address http://www.CPJ.ORG/. See also the World Press liberty Review published by the International Press ground (IPI) in Vienna, Austria. Concern over a surge in killings of, and assaults against, journalists was also expressed at the opening of the Inter-American Press connectors annual meeting in Mexico city on October 20, 1997. See: Wests lede Press Group Decries Attacks on Journalists by Eloy O. Aguilar, A.P. dispatch of October 20, 1997. \n\n10. Another issue for consideration beyond the scope of government and med ia policymaking is the degree to which a public interest group might be useful in advocating hostage rights and protection with the media, and in raising awareness of the issue of balancing the publics right to know against the rights of hostages and the public to have their safety respected by the media. \n\n11. Notably, there have been attempts by media members to impose rules when applications programme terrorist incidents. Standards established by the kale Sun-Times and Daily News include paraphrasing terrorist demands to avoid unbridled propaganda; banning participation of reporters in negotiations with terrorists; set up coverage through supervision editors who are in jobber with police authorities; providing thoughtful, restrained, and likely coverage of stories; and allowing only ranking(prenominal) supervisory editors to determine what, if any, information should be withheld or deferred. Such standards are far from uniformly accepted. See: Terrorism, the Future, an d U.S. Foreign Policy, by Raphael F. Perl, CRS Issue Brief 95112, updated regularly. \n\n12. See: Clinton Suggests OAS Tackle Press exemption Issue, by Lawrence McQuillan, Reuters dispatch of October 17, 1997. \n\nBYLINER: TERRORISM, THE MEDIA, AND THE twenty-first CENTURY\n\n(The author is a specialist in international terrorism policy with the Congressional Research Service of the depository library of Congress) \n\nThe media persist powerful forces in confrontations between terrorists and governments. Appealing to, and influencing, public opinion may impact not only the actions of governments but also on those of groups engaged in terrorist acts. \n\nFrom the terrorist perspective, media coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist act or campaign. And in hostage-type incidents, where the media may provide the only independent means a terrorist has of knowing the chain of events set in motion, coverage can complicate rescue efforts. \n\nGovernments can use the media in an effort to arouse world opinion against the country or group using terrorist tactics. Public diplomacy and the media can also be used to mobilize public opinion in other countries to pressure governments to take action against terrorism. \n\nMargaret Thatcher once drew the similitude that publicity is the oxygen of terrorism. This brings home the point that public relations is a major terrorist limb and the media is a central vehicle for employing that weapon. Terrorism today assumes a role for the media. \n\nThis article examines competing perspectives on the desired role for the media when covering terrorist incidents, and who wants what from the media: what the terrorist wants, what the government wants, and what the media wants when covering a terrorist event. It then addresses three trends that impact on the relationship between terrorism and the media and concludes with options for consideration. \n\nWhat Terrorists Want from the Media -- \n\nTerrorists, governme nts, and the media see the function, roles and responsibilities of the media when covering terrorist events from differing and often patently competing perspectives. Such perceptions drive group behavior during terrorist incidents -- often resulting in both tactical and strategic gains to the terrorist operation and the overall terrorist cause. The challenge to both the governmental and press community is to understand the dynamics of such perspectives and to develop policy options designed to serve coarse interests. \n\n-- Terrorists want publicity, free publicity that a group could normally not afford or get. Any and all publicity alerts the world that a problem exists that cannot be ignored and must be addressed. An unedited interview is a treasured prize, such as the May 1997 CNN interview with Mohammad Bin Ladin. Access to a terrorist is a hot story. \n\n-- They want favorable understanding of their cause, if not their act. One may not agree with their act but this does not p reclude being sympathetic to their suffering and their cause. The public needs help in understanding that their cause is just and terrorist violence is the only course of action available to them against superior evil forces. Good relationships with the press are important here and they are often accomplished and nurtured over a layover of years. \n\n-- Terrorists may also seek to place personnel in press positions -- particularly in wire services -- and in some instances may even seek to control smaller news organizations through funding. One example is Mr. Bin Ladin, who is reported to have funded a hard line Islamic news service in the Gulf. \n\n-- They want legitimacy. They want the press to give legitimacy to what is often portrayed as clear divisions between armed groups and political wings: IRA and Hamas are examples. Musa Abu Marzuq, for example, who was in charge of the political wing of Hamas is believed to have sanction specific bombings and assassinations. Such distin ctions are often designed to help people join the ranks of the terrorist organization. \n\n-- They also want the press to give legitimacy to the findings and viewpoints of specially created non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and study centers that may serve as covers for terrorist fundraising, recruitment and travel by terrorists into the target country. The Palestinian Islamic Jihads funding and control of World and Islam Studies Enterprise is but one known example. The Hamas-funded Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) in Richardson, Texas, is another of many. \n\n-- They want -- in hostage situations -- details on identity, number and value of hostages, details about pending rescue attempts, and details on the public exposure of their operation. Particularly where state sponsors are involved, they want details about any plans for military retaliation. \n\n-- And they want the media to help them cause rail at to the enemy. This is particularly so when the perpetrators of the act and the rationale for their act remain anonymous. They want the media to amplify panic, to spread fear, to facilitate economic loss like loss of tourism, to make populations loose faith in their governments ability to protect them, and to make governments and populations overact to specific incidents and the overall threat of terrorism. \n\nWhat Government Wants from the Media -- \n\nGovernments seek understanding, cooperation, restraint and loyalty from the media in efforts to limit terrorist harm to society and in efforts to punish or apprehend those responsible for terrorist acts, specifically: \n\n-- They want publicity to advance their agenda and not that of the terrorist. From their perspective, the media should musical accompaniment government courses of action when operations are under way and disseminate government provided information when requested. \n\n-- An important goal is to separate the terrorist from the media -- to deny the terrorist a propaganda platform un less to do so is likely to contribute to his imminent defeat. \n\n-- Another goal is to have the media tick off terrorists as common criminals. \n\n-- In hostage situations, generally they prefer to exclude the media and others from the conterminous area, but they want the media to provide intelligence data when the media has access to the hostage site. \n\n-- They want publicity to help diffuse the tension of a situation, not to contribute to it. retentivity the nation calm is an important policy objective. \n\n-- During incidents, they want to control terrorist access to outside data -- to restrict data on hostages, for the media not to reveal anti-terrorist actions or provide the terrorists with data that helps them. \n\n-- afterward incidents, they want the media to keep wet tabs on government craft secrets as to how operations were successfully performed -- and to keep close tabs on successful or thwarted terrorist trade secrets so that emulator terrorists can not simul ate them. \n\n-- They want the media to be careful about being deceived by disinformation. Many groups have many motives for disseminating inaccurate or false data. \n\n-- They also want the media to make government agencies look good. Agencies may carefully control leaks to the press giving scoops to newsmen who then in return make the agency look good and avoid criticism of its actions. \n\n-- They would like journalists to inform them when presented with well grounded reasons to believe a terrorist act may be in the making or that particular individuals may be involved in terrorist activity. \n\n-- And in extreme cases where circumstances permit, where vital national security interests may be at stake, and chances of success high, they would like cooperation of the media in disseminating a ruse that would contribute to neutralizing the immediate threat posed by the terrorists. \n\nWhat the Media Wants When Covering Terrorism -- \n\n any journalist wants the freedom to cover an is sue without restraint -- whether it comes from his/her editor or from the government. \n\n-- The media wants to be the first with the story. Now. The scoop is the golden fleece. ancient news is no news. shove to transmit real time news instantly in todays intensely competitive advanced communication environment is at an all-time high. \n\n-- They want to make the story as timely and dramatic as possible -- an interview, if possible. During the June 1985 TWA Flight 847 hijack crisis, ABC aired extensive interviews with both hijackers and hostages. A photo was even staged of a pistol aimed at the pilots head. \n\n-- For the most part, they want to be professional and accurate and not to give credence to disinformation, however attractive it may seem. \n\n-- They want to protect their ability to operate as securely and freely as possible in the society. In many instances, this concern goes beyond protecting their legal right to publish relatively unrestrained. It translates into per sonal physical security. They want to protect themselves -- not to be killed during operations and not to be murdered by terrorists for providing unfavorable coverage. \n\n-- They do want to protect societys right to know. \n\n-- And they do want to play a constructive role in solving specific terrorist situations if this can be done without excessive cost in terms of story loss or compromise of values. \n\nTrends Impacting on Terrorism and the Media \n\nA number of trends appear to be emerging which impact on the relationship between the media, the terrorist and government. These include: (1) a trend towards anonymity in terrorism; (2) a trend towards more violent terrorist incidents; and (3) a trend towards attacks on media personnel and institutions. \n\nToday we see a trend towards anonymous terrorism where no one claims responsibility and no demands are made. The World plenty Center bombing is but one example. This practice allows the media a larger role in speculation, and ta kes them off the hook from charges that they are amplifying a terrorists demands or agenda. even off so, however, ongoing hyped reporting of terrorists events can advance terrorists agendas such as spreading fear, hurting tourism and provoking strong government reactions, leading ultimately to restrictions on individual liberties. \n\nIn todays hi-info/hi-tech world the potential for more violent terrorism is a reality which cannot be ignored. As terrorism becomes more violent, perceptions that the press is to some degree responsible for facilitating terrorism or amplifying its effects could well grow. Increasingly threatened societies may be prone to take fewer risks in light of mass casualty consequences and may less and less trust the media to police itself. \n\nAttacks on Media Personnel and Institutions -- \n\nWe may also see more of a trend of attacks on journalists who are outspoken on issues of concern to the terrorists. We do not need to look to Algeria, Mexico, Russia, Ch echnia or London for such activity, but here in Washington, D.C. at the National Press Building and at the United Nations in New York. One private watchdog group places the number of journalists killed by terrorists in 1995 at 45. \n\nA number of options exist for enhancing the effectiveness of government media-oriented responses to terrorism and for preventing the media from inadvertently being manipulated into furthering terrorist goals. These include: (1) financing joint media/government training exercises; (2) establishing a government terrorism information response center; (3) promoting use of media pools; (4) promoting voluntary press coverage guidelines; and (5) monitoring terrorism against the media. \n\nJoint Government/Media Training Exercises -- \n\nPublic relations must be ahead of a story -- not reactive. Nations need comprehensive public personal business strategies to combat terrorist-driven initiatives, and the media can play an important role deep down the framewo rk of such a strategy. Training exercises are vital here: exercises such as those conducted by George Washington University and the Technology Institute in Holon, Israel, which bring together government officials and media representatives to simulate government response and media coverage of mock terrorist incidents. \n\nA Government Terrorist Information Response Center -- \n\nOne option governments might consider would be establishment of a standing government terrorist information response center (TIRC). Such a center by agreement with the media could have on call (through communication links) a rapid reaction terrorism reporting pool composed of precedential network, wire-service and print media representatives. Network coverage of incidents would then be coordinated by the network representative in the center. Such a center could be headed by a government spokesperson (the Terrorism Information Coordinator, TIC) who could immediately seek to seize the propaganda initiative fro m the particular terrorist group. \n\nAll too often, when incidents happen in the United States and there is a vacuum on news other than the incident itself, by the time the government agencies agree on and bonny tune what can be said and what positions are to be taken, the government propaganda initiative is already lost. \n\nAnother option, specifically for coverage of hostage type events, would be use of a media pool where news is put out at the same time. If adopted, mechanisms for implementing such a concept should be in place. \n\nVoluntary Press Coverage Guidelines -- \n\nAnother option would be establishment by the media of a loose legislation of voluntary behavior or guidelines that editors and reporters would have access to. A special media summit could be called, perhaps under the G-7 rubric, for senior network and print media executives to develop voluntary guidelines on terrorism reporting. \n\nAreas for discussion might include guidelines on: \n\n-- Limiting informat ion on hostages which could harm them: e.g., number, nationality, official positions, how wealthy they may be or important relatives they have; \n\n-- Limiting information on military movements during rescue operations; \n\n-- Limiting or agreeing not to air live unedited interviews with terrorists; -- Checking sources of information carefully when the pressure is high to report information that may not be accurate; \n\n-- Toning down information that may cause widespread panic. \n\nEven if specific guidelines were not adopted, such a summit would raise understanding in the public policy and press policy community of the respective needs of their respective institutions. \n\n tracking Terrorism Against the Media \n\nFinally, there may be emerging a worldwide trend of more terrorist attacks against media personnel and institutions. Surprisingly, however, readily available government statistics are lacking. One way to bring this point home would be for government reports on terrorism, such as the U.S. Department of States Patterns of Global Terrorism, to include annual statistics worldwide exhibit the number of journalists killed or injure yearly in terrorist attacks and the annual number of terrorist incidents against media personnel or media institutions. \n\nThe media and the government both have common interests in seeing that the media is not inadvertently manipulated into promoting the cause of terrorism or its methods. But on the other hand, policymakers do not want to see terrorism eroding freedom of the press -- one of the pillars of democratic societies. \n\nBy definition this is a dilemma that cannot be completely reconciled -- one with which society will continually have to struggle. Communication between the government and the media here is an important element in any strategy designed to prevent the cause of terrorism from prevailing and in preserving democracy. \n\nThe reality is that terrorism and democracy do not make compatible bedfellows and i n societies run by thugs or radical religious extremists, a free press is one of the first institutions to go. NNNNIf you want to get a full essay, order it on our website:
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